Introduction
The path model for education and social stratification proposed by Blau and Duncan (1967) was one of the first applications of that method in the social sciences, and certainly the most influential. It is often cited as a great success story: see, for example, Adams, Smelser, and Treiman (1982, p. 46). And it set the pattern for much subsequent research.
Indeed, path models are now widely used in the social sciences, to disen-
The errors seem to have nearly constant variance, and follow the normal curve quite nicely. We estimate a and b by ordinary least squares; b turns out to be .05, and the conclusion is that sending people to school for another year will increase their incomes on average by 5%.
This conclusion, however, cannot rest on the way the data look, or even on replication across time or geography. It must depend on a theory of how the data came to be generated. (This is very well known to working social scientists, and I will sketch their argument in a moment; the novelty, if any, is only in the formulation.)
In effect, the theory has to be (or at least have as a consequence) that we are observing the results of a controlled experiment conducted by Nature. Subjects are given some number of years of schooling, and then the logs of their incomes are generated as if by the following two-step procedure:
(i) compute a + b x (education); (ii) add noise. For want of a better term, I will refer to this procedure as a linear statistical law, connecting log income and education; and the whole thing can be called the as-if-by-experiment assumption. A slightly more dramatic theory: We might assume that Nature has randomly assigned people to the different educational levels-an as-if-randomized assumption. (Then the log-linear functional form can be estimated from the data.)
These sorts of theories seem to be implicit in the idea of "structural" or "causal" equations. Of course, it is impossible to tell just from data on the variables in it whether an equation is structural or merely an association. In the latter case, all we learn is that the conditional expectation of the response variable shows some connection to the explanatory variables, in the population being sampled. The decision as to whether an equation is structural must ride either on prior theory or on close examination of data outside the equation. Considering the impact of interventions is a useful armchair exercise to perform in trying to reach the decision, or at least figuring out what it means.
Coming back to income and education, it may be obvious by now that the equation is not structural, even if the data look just like textbook regression pictures. There is a third variable, family background, which drives both education and income. Our coefficient b in the equation picks up the effect of the omitted variable, and is therefore a biased estimate of the impact of the proposed intervention-sending people back to school. Well, responds a strawman investigator, here's a path model to take care of the problem: education = c + d x (family background) + error log (income) = e +f x (education) + g x (family background) + error. This model consists of two equations, assumed to be structural-as if the results of an experiment of nature. (These equations are hard to interpret on the as-if-randomized basis, but they do make sense-right or wrong-as linear statistical laws.) Anyway, says the strawman, now we've got it: f represents the impact of education on income, with family background controlled for.
Unfortunately, it is not so easy. How do we know that it is right this time? What about age, sex, or ability, just for starters? How do we know when the equations will reliably predict the result of interventions-without doing the experiment? In a cartoon example, the objection is clear. In other cases, the point is easily lost in the shuffle. Sad experience shows that all too often, the real modelers pay as little attention to justifying their assumptions as the strawman, and their results are no more convincing.
Of course, the methodological issues are extremely perplexing, and any attempt to bring evidence to bear on the substantive issues deserves considerable sympathy. Duncan (1975) and Wright (1934) 
Regression Models
This section will discuss regression models when the explanatory variable X is under experimental control, and modifications for observational data. Some threats to validity will be identified, and the first successful use of regression models will be noted.
To begin with, suppose that a variable X is under experimental control, and it "causes" Y in the sense that Y = a + bX + U.
(1)
In this equation, U is a random variable-like a draw made at random from a box of tickets. Y is observable, but U is not. The stochastic assumptions are as follows:
The distribution of U is the same, no matter what value of X is selected by the experimenter. (2.1) The expected value of U is 0.
(2.
2) The variance of U is finite.
(2.3) Each time the system is observed, an independent value of U is generated. The stochastic assumptions on U and X are parallel to the ones in the experimental model, except that (2.4) is dropped for now:
The disturbance term U is independent of the explanatory variable X. (4.1) The disturbance term U has mean 0.
(4.
2) The disturbance term and the explanatory variable have finite variance.
3) The disturbance term U is often interpreted as "the effect of omitted variables." If so, intervening to change X should not change U, and this is perhaps the strongest form of the independence hypothesis (4.1). Also, the omitted variables must be assumed independent of the included variables. (See Pratt & Shlaifer, 1984 for discussion.)
With path models, one convention is to standardize the random variables X and Y in Equation (3) to have mean 0 and variance 1. The parameter a will then be 0. (This convention will be followed here for expository rea-sons, and its logic will be reviewed later.) To make the variance of Y come out to 1, another condition is needed: var U = 1 -b2.
(4.4) So far, X and Y are somewhat platonic. The next part of the model introduces data, an X-value and Y-value for each observational unit; these units will be indexed by i. This part of the model is intended to connect the data with the assumed relationship (3-4), and is the analog of (2.4). The data are modeled as observed values of pairs of random variables (Xi, 17), which are independent from unit to unit, and obey the assumptions (3-4).
Technically, the conditions on the data are as follows:
The triplets (Xi, Ui, Y) are independent across units i.
(5.1) For each i, the triplet (Xi, U1, Yi) is distributed like (X, U, Y) in (3-4).
(5.
2) The explanatory variable is Xi, the response variable is 1Y, and the disturbance term Ui is not observable. This sampling model is the basis for estimating b from the data by OLS. (Of course, in the present setup it is the random variables that are standardized, not the data: Standardizing the data is one step in estimating the parameters. Also, some investigators prefer to condition on the X-values; this hardly affects the present argument, but would complicate the exposition, which attempts to define a sampling model and give theorems in terms of population parameters. Be the conditioning as it may, in the present setup the X-values are not under the investigator's experimental control, and that is what matters.)
To make the assumptions more vivid, imagine two boxes of tickets, an X-box and a U-box. In each box, the tickets have numbers on them. The tickets in the X-box average out to 0 with a variance of 1 (the standardization). The tickets in the U-box average out to zero with a variance of 1 -b2. The data are generated as follows. For each observational unit i, draw one ticket at random (with replacement) from the X-box and another, independently, from the U-box. The first ticket shows the value of Xi, and the second, Ui. Now use Equation ( In particular, a causal inference can be made from observational databut its validity depends on the validity of the assumptions on the relationship between X and Y for the interpretation of b, and the connection with the data for its estimation by OLS. Together, the conditions say that The technical assumptions in a path model involve the chance behavior of the disturbance terms Ui. These terms are in principle not observable, so the assumptions are difficult to verify directly. Nor is the chance behavior of an unobservable quantity a topic that fires the imagination. Perhaps as a result, it is hard to get path analysts to focus on the chance assumptions. On the other hand, these assumptions do have empirical content-and should be tested before the model is taken seriously.
What are the main threats to the validity of the assumptions? Three will be mentioned now (cf. Tukey, 1954 Moving on to (iii), suppose the generating equation is (1), but the expected value of U increases linearly with X. Then OLS will produce a biased estimate of b. Put another way, causal inference fails because changing X makes a systematic change in U. One source of such dependence is omitted variables-problem (iii). This problem too is well known to workers in the field, and their solution is to expand the system by adding more variables. That is what path models are all about. In sum, if the main variables in the system can be identified, and their causal ordering, and the form of the regression functions, the models can be more or less easily adapted. But there is a major difficulty: Current social science theory cannot deliver that sort of specification with any degree of reliability, and current statistical theory needs this information to get started.
Indeed, the method of least squares was developed by Gauss (1809/1963) for use in situations where measurements are well defined, where functional forms are dictated by strong theory, and where predictions are routinely tested against observations. The story is worth retelling: Astronomers discovered the asteroid Ceres while making telescopic sweeps, but lost it when it got too close to the Sun. Finding Ceres became one of the major scientific problems of the day.
To solve this problem, Gauss derived the equations connecting the observations on Ceres to the parameters of the orbit, using Newtonian mechanics. He then linearized the equations of motion and estimated the parameters by least squares, making careful estimates of the errors due to the linearization and due to random variation in the data. Finally, he used the equations to predict the current position of Ceres-a prediction borne out by astronomical observation.
In this example, Gauss started from well-established theory that specified the relevant variables and the functional form of their relationship. Much careful work had already been done on the error structure of the astronomical measurements. Finally, the model was tested against reality. These characteristics differentiate the original application of least squares from the application in path models. In situations where theory and measurement are less well developed, simpler and more informal statistical techniques might be preferable.
Path Models
This section will develop path models, as linked sets of structural equations, with the response variable from one equation being an explanatory variable in a second. The assumptions will be highlighted, and the possibility of testing discussed; threats to validity will be discussed. The development is parallel to the one in the previous section, and it is convenient to use the example of X and Y in Equation ( The random variables U and V in (7) are disturbance terms. Equation (7.1) relates X to the exogenous variables; then (7.2) relates Y to X and the exogenous variables. As is usually said, the system is "recursive" rather than "simultaneous." (For more careful definitions, see the next section.)
Informally, Nature selects (Z, W) from some distribution, and generates some noise (U, V). The she or he computes X and Y from (7) and shows (Z, W, X, & Y) to the investigator. The disturbances U and V remain hidden.
The parameters a, b, c, d in (7) are called "path coefficients" and are usually unknown. The following are the stochastic assumptions: By virtue of assumption (9), the full system can be estimated by OLS. And the parameters of the linear statistical laws do have causal interpretations, as in the previous section. For example, suppose we intervene by keeping W and Z fixed but increasing X by one unit: On average, this will cause Y to increase by c units-because the disturbance V in Y is unrelated to Z, W, or X, so the intervention has no systematic impact on V. (The usual interpretation of the coefficients does present some difficulties, to be discussed below in the section on direct and indirect effects.) Again, a causal inference has been made from observational data. This is, I think, the most attractive feature of the methodology. However, its validity depends on the assumption that the variables are related through linear statistical laws-and the path analyst got the variables and arrows right.
These assumptions are embodied in the path diagram and equations (7-8-9). They are inputs to the statistical analysis rather than outputs. All the statistical analysis can do (and it is no mean feat) is to estimate the correlations and path coefficients, or test that particular coefficients are zero-given the assumptions. Standard theory does not offer any strong tests of those assumptions; and the existing ones (plotting residuals, crossvalidation, examining subgroups) are seldom done by path analysts.
The point may be a bit obscured by the somewhat technical way the term causal inference is being used. To restate matters: A theory of causality is assumed in the path diagram (the causal ordering, linear statistical laws, etc.). Within this context, what the path analysis does is to provide a quantitative estimate of the impact of interventions. The path analysis does not derive the causal theory from the data, or test any major part of it against the data. Assuming the wrong causal theory vitiates the statistical calculations.
The Fundamental Theorem One object of path analysis is to decompose correlation coefficients into additive components. Consider for now a general path diagram. The variables are still standardized, and the analogs of (7-8) are in force. The "fundamental theorem" is an identity among correlation coefficients and path coefficients.
First, some terminology and the assumptions. Say a variable X is a "proximate cause" of Y if there is a straight arrow leading from X to Y in the path diagram (i.e., X appears in the regression equation explaining Y). By definition, an "exogenous" variable has no proximate cause whereas an "endogenous" variable has at least one proximate cause. (In this paper, I am taking the exogenous variables to be random, and will state the fundamental theorem and related decompositions at the level of population parameters, rather than sample estimates.)
There is a curved arrow joining every pair of exogenous variables, and one free arrow leading into each endogenous variable. But no free arrows lead into exogenous variables, or curved arrows into endogenous variables. Technically, the set of exogenous variables is assumed independent of the disturbance terms, which are independent among themselves, as in (8.1).
It follows that an endogenous variable is independent of all the disturbance terms-except those among its causes. The identity (11) can be applied recursively, to express any correlation in terms of the path coefficients and the correlations among the exogenous variables. This leads to the deep "path tracing rule" of Wright (1921).
Direct and Indirect Effects
One object of path analysis is to measure the "direct" and "indirect" effects of one variable on another. Take, for example, the path diagram in 
Two investigators who work with different populations and standardize will get different path coefficients-and miss the invariance of a and b. This is not a good research strategy.
On the other hand, the law governing the data could be in terms of standard units-Equation (i). That is, 6 could be invariant across populations. Then fitting (1) in "natural" units will miss the invariance, because a and b vary across populations. Of course, the situation could be more complicated than (1) or (i).
Even if (1) is the right choice, the standard deviations of the disturbance terms in more complex models need not be invariant across populations. Consider, for example, the path model in Figure 3 . Suppose that the law (7-8) underlying the social process is in standard units, so the variables Z, W, X, and Y should be standardized. And the path coefficients will be stable across populations (joint distributions for Z and W). But the standard deviations of the disturbance terms U and V depend on the path coefficients and rzw, so these standard deviations will change from population to population, because rzw depends on the joint distribution of the exogenous variables. Hope measures outcomes in terms of the occupations of his subjects. Only secondary education is considered. The background variables are two: IQ and father's occupation. The American data are drawn from Jencks and will not be discussed here. For Scotland, Hope measures occupations on a 9-point scale, ranging from "professionals and large employers" at the top to "agricultural workers" at the bottom (1984, p. 17). For the path model, occupations were ranked according to "social standing" by 12 college students, and the principal component of the 12 rankings was used as the occupation variable (p. 18).
Secondary education in Scotland was on a track system, and Hope measures this variable on a 7-point scale, according to the track taken by the subjects (1984, p. 14). The top track "completed five years of secondary education in a general course with two foreign languages." The bottom track "three years of secondary education in a modified class (for less able and backward children in an ordinary school)."
The data are from the "Scottish Mental Survey." The sample was drawn in 1947, and consists of all 11-year-old boys born on the first day of every other month. The children were followed until 1964, and data are available on nearly 600 of them, including anthropometry, scores on Form L of the Stanford-Binet IQ test, and a "sociological schedule" that included father's occupation. Sample attrition was less than 10%.
Hope proposes a path model for his four variables; it is shown in Figure  6 Moreover, the school variable in Scotland includes not only characteristics of the schools, but also characteristics of the students. For example, the difference between tracks 1 and 3 lies in whether the students completed the course: This is a measure of students' ability and character, as well as of the education received. The path analysis is being used to separate the inputs to the school from outputs, but the two are already entangled in the school variable-before the path analysis can do anything.
This point has been questioned by some readers. To make the issue clearer, suppose the measured school variable is just another IQ scorelike form M instead of form L. None of the analysis would then have anything to do with education. For a second example in a similar vein, suppose the path model in Figure 6 is educational quality. In this second hypothetical world, the path from IQ to education represents the fact that brighter students choose better schooling, on average. Suppose too that the measured school variable is a linear combination of IQ and the underlying educational quality variable. In this second hypothetical, the estimated path coefficients are substantially biased; and the bias depends on the unknown error structure in the measurements. One of Hope's technical innovations might be viewed as an attempt to get around the second sort of measurement problem. He decomposes the direct effect of education on occupation into an "autonomous" and a "heteronomous" component (1984, pp. 9, 24ff). To define these terms, assume the relationships part of the model in Figure 6 , that is, the analog of (7-8). Let E and O be the endogenous variables, education and occupation; let the exogenous variables be I and F, IQ and father's occupation. Hope's decomposition can be expressed as an equation: POE = POE V + POEPEJ rEI + POEPEF rEF.
(13)
The first term on the right is the "autonomous effect" of education on occupation; v is the variance of the disturbance term in the equation for E.
To understand this term geometrically, let L and 6 be the projections of E and O on the space spanned by I and F; let E = E -Land 0-= O -0, so E' and O are the projections on the orthocomplement. In other words, E' and 0' represent education and occupation, net of IQ and father's occupation: "net" means, after subtracting out the projections. The "autonomous effect" of education on occupation, that is, the first term on the right of (13), turns out to be the covariance of 0' and E'. Since E' is not standardized, the covariance is not a regression coefficient; apparently, division by v = var E' just gives you back POE, as is also clear from (13).
(The remaining two terms in the equation seem to be part of the "heteronomous effect"; however, I see no direct geometric interpretation for them, nor do Hope's verbal descriptions in his table 1.6 make much sense to me, let alone the identification of these terms with the "universalistic" and "particularistic" in education.)
In The theoretical model that informs our analysis of the effects of education on stratification was implicit in the design of the Scottish Mental Survey (Hope, 1980) . It postulates that, for boys, the significant inputs they bring to the social system are cleverness, character, and class. Since we lack comparative data on character, we omit that variable from the current model (it was included in the model in Hope, 1980). At best, this passage justifies including IQ and father's occupation in (12). It does not justify the linearity or the stochastic assumptions. Nor does it justify treating the equations in (12) as structural, rather than mere associations; on the contrary, it flags another important missing variable. And so in the end Hope does not connect Figure 6 with real boys who go to school, graduate, and get jobs. Neither does the cited article (Hope, 1980) , which presents a path model rather like Figure 6 , but including variables labeled "personality" and "qualifications." In that article, there is much ingenuity devoted to the geometry of factor analysis-and none to elucidating the relationship between the geometry and the boys.
Hope is not alone in these respects. Indeed, I do not think there is any reliable methodology in place for identifying the crucial variables in social systems or discovering the functional form of their relationships. In such circumstances, fitting path models is a peculiar research activity: The computer can pass some planes through the data, but cannot bind the arithmetic to the world outside.
At such points as this, modelers will often explain that nothing is perfect, all models are approximations, so maybe Hope's model is good enough: How much difference can the blemishes make? In this particular case, blemishes could really matter, because the differences in path coefficients between Scotland and the U.S. are small (the largest is for the direct effect of IQ on education). And substantial conclusions are drawn from these differences:
What we have shown is that Scotland. Other readers may feel that nobody could be taking the models so seriously; after all, a model is just some way of looking at the data. Well, here is Hope's view: We begin our study by asking whether Scotland was indeed the meritocracy it is often alleged to have been. In the course of answering this question we will refine the definition of meritocracy to the point where its presence or absence, or rather the degree to which it is present, can be assessed in precise, quantitative terms. Of course, no such quantification can be final or irrevocable; nevertheless, it has distinct advantages over imprecise and impressionistic statements. In the first place, it gives us some idea of an order of magnitude we did not possess before. Second it enables us to compare degrees of magnitude in different societies. And in the third place it is disputable on empirical grounds and corrigible according to rational criteria of evidence and rebuttal. But the really significant effect of quantification is, or ought to be, none of these. Rather does it lie in the effort at refining and exploring the meaning of analytical concepts which employment of a model calls for. ... But in so constraining them we will make every effort to see to it that meaning is not warped beyond the bounds of normal usage, but rather is tightened up in a way which will command general approval. (1984, p. 6) Hope is doing something much more ambitious than data analysis. But his statistical technique has led him astray, and he almost knows it:
It will become apparent to the reader that the following work is not modest in its aims. And to those who observe that extensive conclusions are built on fairly exiguous foundations, the author can only reply that this is indeed the case. These seem to me to be quite interesting facts, not much affected by the difficulties in path modeling under discussion. Scotland may be more meritocratic than the U.S., but on the evidence of Figure 6 neither country is exactly caste-ridden; rough insights whose value is considerable. (Something like this is at the core of Blau & Duncan, 1967.) There are now some interesting questions, and to answer them, Hope takes for granted that his measurements on the variables are connected through linear statistical laws. He can hardly be blamed for doing so, because nearly everyone does the same; but it is precisely the move from rough insight to full-blown path model that seems so counterproductive to me.
The path model might be useful to predict the results of interventions, or of changing circumstances, or to provide a better understanding of the stratification process. But this sort of interpretation must ride on a theory, because something is needed to connect the statistical calculations to the process. As far as I can see, this theory is exactly what is missing.
Meta-Arguments
For a historical discussion of path models in sociology, see Bernert (1983) . These models were developed by Wright (e.g., 1921, 1934) for use in genetics. But later applications even in that field remain controversial: see Karlin (1979) Econometrics is an interesting test case for the modeling approach, because the technique is extremely sophisticated, and commercial services using macro-models make real forecasts whose accuracy can be tracked: see Christ (1975) , Litterman (1986) , McNees (1979 McNees ( , 1986 , and Zarnowitz (1979). Basically, the major forecasting models do not do at all well unless their equations are revised frequently, and the intercepts reestimated subjectively by the modelers. Even then, such modeling groups do no better than the forecasters who proceed without models. Finally, the different modeling groups tend to make quite similar forecasts; but their models often disagree sharply about the projected impact of policy actions.
There are prominent critiques of standard econometrics and the underlying data by insiders, starting with the classic exchange between Keynes (1939 Keynes ( , 1940 In some circumstances, regression equations are useful ways to look at data; the coefficients and the standard deviation around the regression plane can be good summary statistics. This is so, at least when the data look something like a sample from a multivariate gaussian distribution. Achen and Veblen have one success story along these lines. So did Blau and Duncan (1967) . And so does Hope, as noted above. But there is a real difference between summarizing data and building path models. To take a simpler example, you can report a batting average without adopting countably additive probability theory and the strong law of large numbers.
The critique of path models in this paper is hardly original. A few words more about some of the conventional responses may be in order. Models are often held to be of value in offering guidelines to decisionmakers rather than descriptions or forecasts of behavior. The test often proposed for such models is whether decisionmakers find them useful. (The argument is strongest for normative models, but is often made for descriptive models as well.) In the present context, this argument seems circular.
Decisionmakers may like path analysis because the models appear to provide answers to important questions, but it is the use of the models by academic investigators that makes the process respectable. (For example, there are plenty of chartists on Wall Street, but their technique is not prominent in our literature.) The real issue is old-fashioned: Why are the answers from the path model at all dependable? In the end, we still need to verify the model's assumptions, by some combination of theory and practice, before recommending its conclusions to the decisionmaker.
We arrive, then, at the descriptive aspect. Here, two points are often made:
(i) Valid inferences can be drawn from axioms known to be false.
(ii) No model is perfect; what counts is that the model should be better than the next-best alternative.
Both points are quite weak. In the present context, the first is almost irrelevant, because the conclusions of path models are so close to their assumptions. More generally, argument (i) can only shift the burden from the assumptions to the conclusions. After all, if the modeler doesn't believe those assumptions, they can hardly be part of his or her reason for believing the conclusions.
Even in the best of theories, individual axioms may not be testable, so the modeler has to consider several axioms in combination and derive testable implications from the set: compare Blalock (1969, chapter 2). So there is a grain of truth to argument (i). However, the street version almost relies on a parody: If A then B, and A is false, therefore B. The anti-syllogism can be traced back to Friedman (1953) , but that time he had to be kidding us.
Argument (ii) has some merit in some situations, but its relevance to statistical modeling in the social sciences is slight. The reason is that there is a wide range of imperfection in human knowledge, and it is not so obvious where to locate path models in that spectrum. The results of a path analysis depend for their validity on some underlying causal theory. If the theory is rejected, the interpretations have no foundation. Why, then, should they be held to dominate alternatives? And other modes of enquiry do exist: De Tocqueville was making comparative studies of the new world and the old long before path models arrived on the scene.
Conclusion
This kind of negative article may seem incomplete. Path analysts will ask, not unreasonably, "Well, what would you do?" To this question, I have no general answer, any more than I can say in general how to do good mathematical research. Still, social science is possible, and needs a strong empirical component. Even statistical technique may prove useful-from time to time.
There are some such techniques on the horizon, which do not depend on prior specification the way path models do: see Asimov (1985) McDonald (1984) . It remains to be seen whether these innovations can be used to make improvements over path analysis. They do offer better data-analytic capabilities. Log linear models should also be mentioned (and their problems noted).
My opinion is that investigators need to think more about the underlying social processes, and look more closely at the data, without the distorting prism of conventional (and largely irrelevant) stochastic models. Estimating nonexistent parameters cannot be very fruitful. And it must be equally a waste of time to test theories on the basis of statistical hypotheses that are rooted neither in prior theory nor in fact, even if the algorithms are recited in every statistics text without caveat.
